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Λέγω

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λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω, λόγιος, λόγιον, ἄλογος, λογικός, λογομαξέω, λογομαχία, ἐκλέγομαι, ἐκλογή, ἐκλεκτός*

λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω

Contents: A. The Words λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω, in the Greek World: 1. λέγω: a. The Basic Meaning of the Root; b. “To gather,” c. “To count,” d. “Toenumerate,” e. “To narrate,” “to say”; 2. λόγος: a. “Collection”; b. “Counting,” “reckoning.” i. “Calculation,” if. “Account,” iii. “Consideration,” “evaluation,” iv. “Reflection,” “ground,” “condition”; c. κατάλογος: “enumeration,” “catalogue”; d. λόγος: “narrative,” “word,” “speech,” etc. 3. ῥη̂μα; 4. λαλέω, λαλιά. B. The Logos in the Greek and Hellenistic World: 1. The Meaning of the Word λόγος in its Multiplicity; 2. The Development of the λόγος Concept in the Greek World: a. The Two Sides of the Concept; b. Heraclitus; c. The Sophists; d. Socrates and Plato; e. Aristotle; 3. The λόγος in Hellenism: a. Stoicism; b. Neo-Platonism; c. The Mysteries; d. The Hermes-Logos-Theology, Hermeticism; 4. The λόγοι of Philo of Alexandria; 5. Hellenistic Logos Speculation and the New Testament. C. The Word of God in the OT; 1. The Hebrew Equivalents of the Greek Terms for Word; 2. The General Use of דָּבָר as a Rendering of λόγος and ῥη̂μα; 3. The דָּבָר of Prophetic Revelation: a. Revelation in Sign; b. Revelation in Sign and Word; c. Dissolution of the Sign; d. The Writing Prophets; 4. The ρβ̀Δ̀ as Revelation of Law; 5. The Divine Word of Creation; 6. The Word in Poetry. D. Word and Speech in the New Testament: 1. Basic and General Aspects of the Use of λέγω/λόγος; 2. More Specific and Technical Meanings; 3. The Sayings of Jesus: a. The Quotation of theSayings; b. The Authority of the Sayings; c. The Appeal to the Word of Jesus outside the Gospels; 4. The Old Testament Word in the New Testament; 5. The Special Word of God to Individuals in the New Testament: a. Simeon; The Baptist; b. The Apostolic Period; c. Jesus; 6. The Early Christian Message as the Word of God (outside the Johannine Writings): a. Statistics; b. Content; 7. The Character and Efficacy of the Early Christian Word (outside the Johannine Writings): a. The Word as God’s Word; b. The Relation of Man to the Word; c. The Word as Spoken Word; 8. The Word in the Synoptic Account of Jesus; 9. The Word in the Synoptic Sayings of Jesus; 10. λόγοσ/λόγοι (του̂ θεου̂) in Revelation; 11. Jesus Christ the λόγος του̂ θεου̂; 12. 1 Jn. 1:1 ff.; 13. The Distinctiveness of the λόγος Saying in Jn. 1:1 ff.; 14. The Concern and Derivation of the λόγος Sayings in the Prologue to John, I: a. The Lack of Speculative Concern; b. The Allusion to Gn. 1:1; c. Other Connections; d. Relation to “Word” Speculations in the Contemporary World; 15. The Concern and Derivation of the λόγος Sayings in the Prologue to John, II: Logos and Torah.

A.     The Words λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα, λαλέω in the Greek World.

It is hardly possible in this context to give a full history of the Greek words for “to say,” “to speak,” “to tell,” “word,” “speech” etc. such as that attempted by J. H. H. Schmidt, I, 1–112, or more briefly E. Hofmann, 120 ff. It must suffice to lay the foundation for the philosophical use of λόγος (→ B.) and for the use of the terms λέγω, λόγος, ῥη̂μα and λαλέω in the OT and NT (→ C.D. → ῥη̂μα, → λαλέω).

1.     λέγω.1

a. The Basic Meaning of the Root. The basic meaning of leg- is “to gather.” This may be seen from the Lat. as well as the Greek (→ b.),2 for both the simple legere (e.g., oleam, nuces, also vestigia, oram) and the compounds colligere, deligere and eligere have kept this meaning,3 which may also be seen in the Albanian mb-l’eθ, “gather,” “reap.”4 To gather is to pick out things which from some standpoint are alike.5 It implies on the one side “succession,” “repetition,” and on the other “judgment,” “logical separation.” Both ideas are broadly developed in λέγω and λόγος.

b. λέγω is very common in the sense “to gather,” e.g., in Hom. ὀστέα (Il., 23, 239), or αἱμασιάς (material for a wall, Od., 18, 359), also mid. “to assemble” (λέξασθαι, Il., 2, 125) and “to collect for oneself” (ὀστέα, Il., 24, 793; ξύλα, 8, 507 and 547; ἄνδρας ἀρίστους, Od., 24, 108 [κρινάμενος, by sifting]): so also the compounds, from the time of Hom. ἀνα—, “to glean” and συλ—, “to gather,” and from the class. period ἀπο— and ἐκ—, “to select.”

c. “To count.” The material or mental gathering one after the other of similar things can often be linked with counting. Thus λέγω can sometimes mean “to count”: Hom.Od., 4, 450 ff.: Proteus followed all the seals and counted them (λέκτο δʼ ἀριθμόν), among them the Greeks (disguised as seals) (ἡμέας πρώτους λέγε).

d. “To enumerate,” i.e., to recall from memory things of the same kind with a view to impartation. So in Hom. and his imitators (ἔργα, κήδεα, “sufferings,” ὀνείδεα, “deeds of shame,” πάντα, ταυ̂τα), also with κατα— (from Hom.Od., 16, 235; 22, 417), “to draw up,” “to enter on a list,” “to enlist” (soldiers). The enumeration usually aims at completeness, hence in Hom. (πα̂σαν) ἀληθείην καταλέξαι acc. to the basic sense of ἀλήθεια: “not concealing or forgetting anything” (→ I, 238), and without obj. with ἀτρεκέως (?), and in Hes.Theog., 627 with ἅπαντα διηνεκέως, “everything thoroughly.”

e. “To narrate,” “to say.” Soon after Hom. a further step was taken, and the complete enumeration of things or events of the same kind became the narration, depiction or recounting of various matters, and then speaking in general.6 Already in Hes.Theog., 27: ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοι̂α, it is better to translate “narrate” than “enumerate.” Then we quickly find many passages in which λέγειν περί τινος means “to speak about something,” Sappho Fr., 149 (Diehl, I, 387) and Xenophanes Fr., 8, 4 (I, 131, 10, Diels5), cf. λέγειν τι κατά τινος, Theogn., 1239 f. (Diehl, I, 180), λέγειν as the opp. of ᾄδειν from Anacr. Fr.&, 32 (Diehl, I, 456), ἅσσα λέγω, Xenophanes Fr., 34, 2 (I, 137, 3, Diels5). From the time of Pindar and the tragedians the word λέγειν is then common in many shades of meaning, with the acc. and infin, from Pind.Pyth., 2, 60: τω̂ν πάροιθε γενέσθαι ὑπέρτερον, with the acc. of person and object, esp. κακὰ (ἀγαθὰ) λέγειν τινά(ς), “to speak evil (good) of (to) someone,” e.g., Hdt., VIII, 61; Aristoph.Eccl., 435 (also εὐ̂, κακω̂ς λέγειν τινά(ς), e.g., Aesch.Ag., 445; Soph.El., 524), with acc. of person and pred., “to name,” e.g., Aesch.Ag., 896: λέγοιμʼ ἂν ἄνδρα τόνδε with many predicates. With more precise content, “to mean or mention someone or something,” e.g., Aristoph.Eq., 1021: ταυτὶἐγὼ οὐκ οἰ̂δʼ τι λέγει, Aesch.Prom., 946: τὸν πυρὸς κλέπτην λέγω (“I mean”); so also τι, οὐδὲν λέγειν, “to say something, nothing important”: Soph.Oed. Tyr., 1475: λέγω τι; “am I right?”, Aristoph.Thes., 625: οὐδὲν λέγεις, “nonsense!”, Hdt., I, 124: τὰ γράμματα (writing) ἔλεγε τάδε, Plat.Ap., 24e, also πω̂ς λέγεις, “how do you think that?” Also very commonly λέγουσι, λέγεται, λέγονται, “it is said,” Pind.Pyth., 5, 108: λεγόμενον ἐρέω, “I will say something which is commonly said.” Of the orator, Isoc., 3, 8: ῥητορικοὺς καλου̂μεν τοὺς ἐν τῳ̂ πλήθει λέγειν δυναμένους. δεινὸς λέγειν, “a skilled orator,” e.g., Soph.Oed. Tyr., 545. Several compounds are linked with this meaning, e.g., ἀντι—, “to contradict” (from the time of the tragic dramatists), ἀμφι(λ)— “to speak pro and con,” “to debate about something,” “to contest” (esp. in Doric inscr.), προ— “to foretell” (from Hdt. and Soph.), “to proclaim,” “to make known” (from Pindar and the tragedians), διαλέγομαι “to talk together” (from Hdt.). With the transition to the sense “to speak,” “to say,” λέγειν approximates to εἰπει̂ν and the root ῥη (→ 3.).7 Cf. εἰπει̂ν aor. “to make an utterance in speech,” “to express” and λέγειν pres. (“to enumerate”) “to narrate,” “to depict,” “to draw,” e.g., εἰ̂πε, “he made a proposition,” ἔλεγε, “he made a speech,” λέγε, λεγʼ, ὠ̂ ʼγαθέ, “speak on,” Aristoph.Eccl., 213, λέγε δή, “speak about it,” Plat.Phaedr., 271c, εἰπέ, “say it,” “speak,” “mention it” (e.g., εἴπʼ ἄγε μοι καὶ τόνδε, φίλον τέκος, ὅστις ὅδʼ ἐστίν, Hom.Il., 3, 192); cf. also Zeno Eleates Fr., 1 (I, 255, 19, Diels5): ἅπαξ τε εἰπει̂ν καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν. Because of its durative significance λέγειν is better adapted than the instantaneous εἰπει̂ν to be the opp. of “to do,” “to-listen,” or “to be silent,” cf. Theogn., 1180 (Diehl, I, 177): Fear of the gods hinders man μήθʼ ἕρδειν μήτε λέγειν ἀσεβη̂, Democr. Fr., 86 (II, 161, 5, Diels5): πλεονεξίη (presumption) τὸ πάντα λέγειν, μηδὲν δὲ ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν, Aesch.Sept. c. Theb., 619: φιλει̂ δὲ σιγα̂ν λέγειν τὰ καίρια.

2.     λόγος.8

Both in general and in detail the development of λόγος is exactly parallel to that of λέγω.

a. The sense “collection” (cf. 1. b.) is attested only of a number of compounds and derivatives,9 e.g., σύλλογος, “gathering” (from Hdt. and the tragedians), παλίλλογος, “assembled again,” Hom.Il., 1, 126, and in class. times often with —λόγος “assembling” (also → σπερμολόγος), and —λογει̂ν, and cf. the Hell. → λογεία, λογεύειν.

b. “Counting,” “reckoning.” This sense, which one would expect from 1. c., is very rare, cf. Aristoph. Nu., 619: τη̂ς ἑορτη̂ς μὴ τυχόντες (the gods) κατὰ λόγον τω̂ν ἡμερω̂ν (cf. Hdt., I, 47: ἡμερολογει̂ν τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, “to count by days”), and the class, γενεαλογει̂ν, “to count the generations” (→ I, 663; 665). Related, but also rare, is λόγος in the sense of “number,” e.g., Hdt., III, 120: ἐν ἀνδρω̂ν λόγῳ, Thuc., VII, 56, 4: ξύμπας λόγος (?), “the totality,” Aesch.Pers., 343: ὡ̂δʼ ἔχει λόγος (the number previously mentioned). Much more important is the sense of reckoning numbers (though there is nothing corresponding in the case of λέγειν). This is found from the beginning of the class, time, is common throughout the Greek world, and occurs frequently in the inscr. and pap.

i. “Calculation.” It is used for accounts: Hdt., III, 142: λόγον δώσεις τω̂ν μετεχείρισας χρημάτων, 143: ὡς δὴ λόγον τω̂ν χρημάτων δώσων, IG, I2 several times (from c. 434 b.c.; v. Index), IG, IV, 1485 (Epidauros, 4th cent. b.c.), 145, 151, 154, 155: λόγος λάμματος, “total income,” 161, 173, 178, and 1487, 12 and 18: λόγος δαπάνας, “total expenditure.” In Hellenistic Roman Egypt the written calculation becomes the account or balance or financial statement (Preisigke Wört., II, 33 f.).

ii. “Account.” More generally the word can be used for an account of other than financial matters, e.g., Hdt., VIII, 100: The Greeks will inevitably become thy slaves δόντας λόγον (as they are punished) τω̂ν ἐποίησαν νυ̂ν τε καὶ πρότερον, Plat.Polit., 285e: λόγον αἰτει̂ν, Demosth.Or., 30, 15: λόγον ἀπαιτει̂ν, Plat.Prot., 336c: λόγον δου̂ναι καὶ δέξασθαι. → λογίζομαι and derivatives belong under i. and ii.

iii. From expressions like “to take account of” there arises the sense of “consideration,” “review,” “evaluation,” “value,” e.g., Heracl. Fr., 39 (I, 160, 2, Diels5): οὑ̂ πλείων λόγος τω̂ν ἄλλων, Aesch.Prom., 231 f.: βροτω̂νλόγον οὐκ ἔσχεν οὐδέν(α), so esp. the class, phrases ἐν (οὐδενὶ) λόγῳ ποιει̂ν τινα or τι, (ἐλαχίατου, πλείστου, οὐδενὸς) λόγου γίγνεσθαι, etc., ἄξιος λόγου, “worth noting,” (also ἀξιόλογος), cf. also → λόγιος. Weaker, “respect,” e.g., Thuc., III, 46, 4, ἐς χρημάτων λόγον.

iv. From i. and iii. it is an easy step to the meanings “reflection,” “ground,” “condition,”10 which became important in everyday use and in philosophy, e.g., Aesch.Choeph., 515: ἐκ τίνος λόγου, “on what ground,” lit. from what calculation, Leucippus Fr., 2 (II, 81, 5 f., Diels5): Everything takes place ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπʼ ἀνάγκης, “for a specific reason and under the pressure of necessity,” Gorg. Fr., 11a, 37 (II, 303, 18 f., Diels5): ἔχει λόγον, “there is a reason,” Hdt., III, 36: ἐπὶ τῳ̂δε τῳ̂ λόγῳ ὥστε …, “on the ground of deliberation,” i.e., with a purpose, Plat.Gorg., 512c: τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ, “on what cogent ground,” Hdt., VII, 158: ἐπὶ λόγῳ τοιῳ̂δε (“on the condition”) τάδε ὑπίσχομαι, ἐπʼ ᾡ̂ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ δὲ λόγῳ οὔτʼ ἂν αὐτὸς ἔλθοιμι οὔτʼ ἂν ἄλλους πέμψαιμι, Democr. Fr., 76 (II, 159, 17, Diels5): νηπίοισιν οὐ λόγος (“rational consideration, understanding or persuasion,” “good counsel”?), ἀλλὰ ξυμφορὴ γίγνεται διδάακαλος, Hdt., I, 132 and elsewhere: λόγος αἱρέει “reason counsels.” On the further development in philosophy → B.; cf. also → ἄλογος → ἁμολογει̂ν, → ἀναλογία.

c. καταλέγειν, “to count (up),” gives us κατάλογος, “list,” “catalogue” (from the time of Aristoph. and Thuc.).

d. “Narrative,” “word,” “speech,” etc. The starting-point, as in the case of λέγειν (→ 1. e.), is “narrative.” Hom. has only this sense, and only in the plur.: Il., 15, 393: τὸν ἔτερπε λόγοις, Od., 1, 56 f.: αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοι̂σι καὶ αἱμυλίοισι λόγοισιν θέλγει, then Hom. Hymn. Merc., 317 and Hes.Theog., 890, more freely Hes.Op., 78 and 789: αἱμυλίους λόγους. Less clearly Hes.Op., 106: εἰ δʼ ἐθέλεις, ἕτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον (“narrative” or “rational explanation”?) ἐκκορυθώσω (will propound the main heads; there follows a description of the 4 ages of the world).11 Yet immediately after the age of the ancient epic λόγος is used for “what is spoken” in the widest and most varied sense. In so doing it replaces ἔπος, which was taken from the Indo-European12 to denote a “spoken utterance,” the “word” (esp. the “idle” or “mere word” as distinct from the act),13 and → μυ̂θος, the earlier word for “meaningful statement,”14 “fable,” “dictum.”15 ἔπος came to be almost completely limited to the sense of “verse” and μυ̂θος to be used only for (invented or not very well established) “history” in contrast to λόγος, (rationally established and constructed) “speech.” The victory of λόγος is the result of the permeation of philosophical thinking in the transition from the heroic to the class, period.16 Of the many nuances we may emphasise various kinds of utterance like “fable” (Plat.Phaed., 60d: οἱ του̂ Αἰσώπου λόγοι), “legend” (Hdt., II, 62: ἱρὸς λόγος), “ancient proverb” (Pind.Pyth., 3, 80: εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέμεν κορυφὰν [the last sense] … ὀρθὰν ἐπίστᾳ), “stories” (Hdt., I, 184: ἐν τοι̂σι ʼΑσσυρίοισι λόγοισι, Xenophanes, 7, 1 [I, 130, 19, Diels5]: ἄλλον ἔπειμι λόγον, a story in a dream, Hdt., I, 141), “command” (Aesch.Pers., 363: πα̂σιν προφωνει̂ τόνδε ναυάρχοις λόγον), “promise” (Soph.Oed. Col., 651: simple promise as distinct from formal oath), “good or evil reputation” (Pind.Isthm., 5, 13: λόγος ἐσθλός, Eur.Heracl., 165: λόγος κακός), “tradition” (Hdt., III, 32: διξὸς λέγεται λόγος, Soph.Trach., 1: λόγος μὲν ἔστʼ ἀρχαι̂ος ἀνθρώπων φανείς ὡς …, often λόγος ἐστί, “the story is”); “written account,” hence “writing” or part of such (Hdt., VI, 19: μνήμην ἑτέρωθι του̂ λόγου ἐποιησάμην, v. 22: ἐν τοι̂σι ὄπισθε λόγοισι ἀποδέξω, Plat.Parm., 127d: πρω̂τος λόγος), “speech” as a work of art,” e.g., ἐπιτάφιος λόγος, “funeral oration,” Plat.Menex., 236b; “speech” as distinct from action (Democr. Fr., 145 [II, 171, 4, Diels5]: λόγος ἔργου σκιή; often λόγῳ μὲνἔργῳ δέ), or from truth (Lyc., 23: ἵνα μὴ λόγον οἴησθε εἰ̂ναι, ἀλλʼ εἰδη̂τε τὴν ἀλήθειαν), or from silence (Pind. Fr., 180: σιγά is often better than λόγος); λόγοι, “conversation” (εἰς λόγους ἐλθει̂ν, λόγους ποιει̂ν etc.). Formally λόγος is the “utterance of thought in speech” (Plat.Soph., 263e: λόγοςδιάνοια) “sentence” (Aristot. De Sophisticis Elenchis, I, p. 165a, 13: the opp. of ὄνομα “word”; among grammarians the μέρη του̂ λόγου are the parts of a sentence or parts of speech), “prose” (Pind.Nem., 6, 30: opp. of ἀοιδαί, Plat.Resp., III, 390a: of ποίησις, poetry). Sometimes the account of a thing and the thing itself merge, so that λόγος can be translated “thing”:17Theogn., 1055 (Diehl, I, 169): λόγον του̂τον ἐάσομεν, Hdt., I, 21: σαφέως προπεπυσμένος πάντα λόγον, VIII, 65: μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸν λόγον του̂τον εἴπῃς, Soph.Oed. Tyr., 684: τίς ἠ̂ν λόγος (682: δόκησις ἀγνὼς λόγων), cf. 699 πρα̂γμα, Isoc., 4, 146: μηδένα λόγον (“material to be recounted”) ὑπολιπει̂ν.

Cf. the compounds and derivatives → ἄλογος, ἀντιλογία, ἀπολογει̂σθαι, → εὐλογει̂ν.

3.     ῥη̂μα.

The root (Ϝ)ερ— (Ϝ)ρη18 only exceptionally in Gk. forms a present, though the other tenses are common: fut. ἐρέω ἐρω̂, aor. pass. ἐρρήθην, Ion εἰρέθην, Hell. ἐρρέθην, perf. εἴρηκα εἴρημαι. Thus the sense is clearly non-durative, “to state specifically.” Of the derivatives19 the same is true esp. of ῥήτρα (Aeolic Ϝ ράτρα), “saying,” “treaty,” and the verbal adj. → ῥητός, “definitely stated,” “expressly laid down.” In related languages the verb is practically never found but the extension is ancient, e.g., Lat. verbum Old Prussian wirds, Lithuanian var̃das (“name”), German Wort. Eng. “word.” ῥη̂μα,20 then, is what is definitely stated (at first usually in the plur.). Thus in solemn announcement, Archiloch.Fr., 52 (Diehl, I, 226): [ὠ̂] Λιπερνη̂τες πολι̂ται, τἀμὰ δὴ ξυνίετε ῥήματ(α) (cf. Aristoph. Pax, 603: ὠ̂ σοφώτατοι γεωργοί …), of military orders in the epigram of Simonides (Fr., 92 [Diehl, II, 94]) on the Spartans who fell at Thermopylae: τοι̂ς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι,21 but with the weaker sense of “statements,” “words” already in Theog., 1152 == 1238b (Diehl, I, 174, 180): Do not change the friend δειλω̂ν ἀνθρώπων ῥήμασι πειθόμενος, Hdt., VIII, 83: τοι̂σι δὲ ῞Ελλησι ὡς πιστὰ δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ἠ̂ν τω̂ν τηνίων ῥήματα, Pind.Nem., 4, 94: ῥήματα πλέκων. So also in the sing., Pind.Pyth., 4, 277 f.: Of a statement of Hom., Hdt.., VII, 162: νόος του̂ ῥήματος, τὸ ἐθέλει λέγειν, Plat.Prot., 343b: του̂ Πιττακου̂, 342e: ῥη̂μα ἄξιον λόγου βραχύ (pithy saying in contrast to long speeches, λόγοι). Words as distinct from deeds, Pind.Nem., 4, 6: ῥη̂μα, Thuc., V, 111, 3: Men fall into misfortune because they submit to the ῥη̂μα (previously ὄνομα ἐπαγωγόν, magically enticing word) of expected misfortune. Words as opposed to truth, Plat.Phaed., 102b: οὐχ, ὡς τοι̂ς ῥήμασι λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; In Plato’s time grammatical and philosophical thought22 took over the word, at first with a fluid line of demarcation: Plat.Crat., 399b: ῥη̂μα, syntactical connection as distinct from ὄνομα, material or personal connection (cf. Aeschin.Or., 3, 72: ῥη̂μα, the wording of the whole saying, ὄνομα the offensive word in it), 431b: ὄνομα and ῥη̂μα together form the sentence (λόγος), cf. 425a; Theaet., 206d: λόγος is the intimation of the thought μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, Soph., 262a: τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ται̂ς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα (the rendering of acts in speech) ῥη̂μά που λέγομεντὸ δέ γʼ ἐπʼ αὐτοι̂ς τοι̂ς ἐκείνας πράττουσι σημει̂ον τη̂ς φωνη̂ς ἐπιτεθὲν (the phonetic sign for the doers of the acts) ὄνομα,23 and this distinction between ῥη̂μα (active word) and ὄνομα (personal and material designation) led to the grammatical use of ῥη̂μα for verb and ὄνομα for noun (from Aristot. Poët., 20, p. 1457a, 11 ff.). Except in this special sense the word does not seem to have lived on in the postclass. period, Ditt. Syll.3, 1175, 5f., 18 f., 36f. (cursing tablet from c. 300 b.c.): ῥη̂μα μοχθηρὸν πονηρὸν φθένγεσθαι, pap. only from the 3rd cent. a.d.24

4.     λαλέω, λαλιά.

a. λαλέω and related words25 like the Lat. lallus (the “nurse’s crooning”), lallare (“to lull to sleep”), the Germ. lallen and the Eng. “lull” imitate the babbling of small children. Hence to use the word of the speech of adults is a sign of either intimacy or scorn: “to prattle,” Aristoph.Eq., 348 (σεαυτῳ̂), Alexis Fr., 9, 10 (CAF, II, p. 300): λαλει̂ν τι καὶ ληρει̂ν πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἡδέως in a light whisper, Pherecrates Fr., 131, 2 (CAF, I, p. 183): μελιλώτινον (sweet as Melilotus) λαλω̂ν (cf. Fr., 2, 3 [CAF, I, p. 145]);26 “to babble,” Aristoph.Lys., 627: καὶ λαλει̂ν γυναι̂κας οὔσας ἀσπίδος χαλκη̂ς πέρι,, Eccl., 1058: ἕπουδευ̂ρʼ ἀνύσας καὶ μὴ λάλει. It is found as the opp. of rational normal speech (λέγειν):27 Eupolis Fr., 95 (CAF, I, p. 281): λαλει̂ν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν, and to correct answering: Plat.Euthyd., 287d: λαλει̂ςἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι. So also of animal sounds as compared with human speech, Philemo Fr., 208 (CAF, II, p. 532): μὲν χελιδὼν τὸ θέρος, ὠ̂ γύναι, λαλει̂,, Plut. De Placitis Philosophorum, V, 20, 4 (II, 909a): λαλου̂σι μὲν γὰρ οὑ̂τοι (apes), οὐ φράζουσι, Theocr.Idyll., 5, 34: of the locust, Aristophon. Fr., 10, 6 (CAF, II, p. 280): of the grasshopper; also the sounds of musical instruments: Anaxandrides Fr., 35 (CAF, II, p. 149): μάγαδιν λαλήσω μικρὸν ἅμα σοι καὶ μέγαν, Aristot. De Audibilibus, p. 801a, 29: διὰ τούτων (flute etc.).

But λαλει̂ν can also be used quite objectively of speech when there is reference to sound rather than meaning, Aristoph.Thes., 267: ἢν λαλῃ̂ς, of a man dressed as a woman,28 Ra., 750 f.: παρακούων δεσποτω̂ν, ἅττʼ ἂν λαλω̂σι, Antiphanes Fr., 171, 2 (CAF, II, p. 80): ἀποπνίξεις δέ με καινὴν πρός με διάλεκτον (speech) λαλω̂ν, Alexis Fr. (CAF, II, p. 369): μετʼ ʼΑττικιστὶ δυναμένου λαλει̂ν. It can even be used of understandable speech, Strato Fr., 1, 45 f. (CAF, III, p. 362): πλὴν ἱκέτευον αὐτὸν (the cook who used many unintelligible words) λαλη̂σαι, Ps.-Plat.Ax., 366d: of a crying infant which cannot yet express in words (λαλη̂σαι) what it wants. “Speak of something” (acc.): Aristoph.Thes., 577 f.: πρα̂γμα λαλούμενον29 (“of which one speaks”). “Ability to speak” as a characteristic of man. Aristot.Probl., XI, 1, p. 899a, 1: Only man λαλει̂, Herond., IV, 32 f.: If it were not a stone statue, one would say: τοὔργον λαλήσει.30 “To speak” as the opp. of “to be silent”: Simonides in Plut.Athen., 3 (II, 346 f.) calls poetry a ζωγραφία λαλου̂σα, and painting a ποίησις σιωπω̂σα, Luc.Vit. Auct., 3: ἡσυχίη μακρὴ καὶ ἀφωνίη καὶ πέντε ὅλων ἐτέων λαλέειν μηδέν.

In the compounds the meaning in the class. period is always “to prattle” or “babble”: δια—, Eur.Cyc., 175, ἐκ—, Eur.Fr., 219, 2 (TGF), Demosth.Or., 1, 26, Hippocr. Jusiurandum (IV, p. 630, Littré), κατα—, Aristoph.Ra., 752, περι—, Aristoph.Eccl., 230, Fr. 376 (CAF, I, p. 490), προσ—, Antiphanes Fr., 218, 3 (CAF, II, p. 107), Heniochus Fr., 4, 3 (CAF, II, p. 432).

b. λαλιά31 is defined by Theophr.Char., 7, 1 as ἀκρασία του̂ λόγου, “excess of speech,” cf. also Ps.-Plat.Def., 416 (with the addition of ἄλογος), i.e., “talk,” “chatter,” Aristoph.Nu., 930 f.: εἴπερ γʼ αὐτὸν σωθη̂ναι χρὴ καὶ μὴ λαλιὰν μόνον ἀσκη̂σαι, Aeschin.Or., 2, 49: ἀποδιατρίβωσι (waste time) τὴν ὑπερόριον (about what is foreign) λαλιὰν ἀγαπω̂ντες ἐν τοι̂ς οἰκείοις πράγμασιν, “garrulity”: Aristoph.Ra., 1069: λαλιὰν ἐπιτηδευ̂σαι καὶ στωμυλίαν.

Debrunner

B.     The Logos in the Greek and Hellenistic World.

1.     The Meaning of the Word λόγος in Its Multiplicity.

Although little used in epic,32 λόγος; achieved a comprehensive and varied significance with the process of rationalisation which characterised the Greek spirit. Indeed, in its manifold historical application one might almost call it symbolic of the Greek understanding of the world and existence.

The etym. enables us to perceive the decisive and, in their συμπλοκή,33 basically significant features of the concept. The noun of λέγειν, λόγος means fundamentally “gathering” or “gleaning” in the selective and critical sense. Cf. Hom.Od., 24, 107 f.: οὐδέ κεν ἄλλως κρινάμενος λέξαιτο κατὰ πτόλιν ἄνδρας ἀρίστους.

Figuratively, but even as mental activity directed to something present, λόγος has the original sense of “counting,” “reckoning,” “explaining.” Emphasising the critical as well as the counting side of λέγειν (cf. συλλέγειν), the use34 of λόγος embraces the following senses.

a. “Counting up,” “recounting” (Hdt., II. 123, Where λόγος refers to the whole narrative), “account” (→ b.), the sum of individual words (ἔπη) to form the comprehensive construct “speech” or “language” (esp. prose as distinct from ποίησις,35 Plat.Resp., III, 390a), “sentence” or “saying.” Because λόγος, as distinct from → μυ̂θος,36 which is a developing or invented narrative or tradition in the poetic or religious sphere, always refers to something material, it is either that which is at issue (Hdt., I, 21; Soph.Trach., 484), or that which is recounted of someone, i.e., good or bad repute (Aesch.Prom., 732; Eur.Phoen., 1251; Heracl., 165), renown (Pind.Nem., 4, 71; Hdt., IX, 78; Heracl. Fr., 39 [I, 160, 2, Diels5]), saga (Pind.Nem., 1,34b), history (Hdt., VI, 137).

b. “Account,” “reckoning,” “result of reckoning” (a) in a more metaphysical sense as the principle or law which can be calculated or discovered in calculation (Heracl.Fr., 1 [I, 150, 1 ff., Diels5]) or often the reason which is the product of thought and calculation (Aesch.Choeph., 515; Leucipp. Fr., 2 [II, 81, 5, Diels5]), the argument or explanation (cf. λόγον διδόναι, “to give an account,” “to account for”; (b) as an economic or commercial term: “reckoning” (συναίρω λόγον, Mt. 18:23; cf. P. Oxy., I. 113, 28; BGU, 775, 19); “cash account” (δημόσιος λόγος), “account” etc. (very frequently in the pap.).37

c. As a technical term in mathematics:38 “proportion,” “relation,” “element” in the sense of Euclid (ed. I. L. Heiberg, II [1884]). V Definitio 3: λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγέθων ὁμογενω̂ν κατὰ πηλικότητά ποια σχέσις, Plat.Tim., 32b; common in Democr.; Plot.Enn., III, 3, 6. Here the orderly and rational character implicit in the term is quite clear. With the interrelation of mathematics and philosophy, λόγος, as the rational relation of things to one another, then acquires the more general sense of “order” or “measure” (Hdt., III, 119; Heracl. Fr., 31 [I, 158, 13, Diels5]; Fr., 45 [I, 161, 2, Diels5]).

d. From the second half of the 5th century it is used subjectively for man’s ratio, his ability to think (synon. with → νου̂ς), “reason” (Democr.Fr., 53 [II, 157, 1 ff., Diels5]), the human “mind” or “spirit,” “thought” (Democr.Fr., 146 [II, 171, 6 ff., Diels5]).

Since λόγος has so many meanings,39 for a right understanding it is important that they all converge into one concept and all-embracing content which is more or less systematically dissected again by later grammarians and rhetoricians,40esp. in the Scholia Marcinns in Artis Dionysianae, 11 (Grammatici Graeci, ed. A. Hilgard, I, 3 [1901], 353, 29–355, 15). Socrates refers back to the material connections present in the concept itself when in Plat.Theaet. he tries to give a progressive explanation of the untranslatable term λόγος, because he wishes to show that it is a significant preliminary stage in the rise of supreme ἐπιστήμη, of which the capacity for λόγον δου̂ναι καὶ δέξασθαι is an important aspect, Plat.Theaet., 206d ff.: τὸ μὲν πρω̂τον εἴη ἂν (sc. λόγος) τὸ τὴν αὑτου̂ διάνοιαν ἐμφανη̂ ποιει̂ν διὰ φωνη̂ς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων. The λόγος is first, then, the expression of διάνοια in words. It is secondly (206e–208b) the enumeration in correct order of the elements in a subject: τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἰ̂ναι (207C). Finally, it is the establishment of the particular, ᾡ̂ ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν, within the κοινόν (208c), i.e., the definition41 and sometimes even the nature or essence.42

By reason of its structure λόγος in the course of its development necessarily entered into relations and parallels and connections and equations with a whole series of basic philosophical terms43 such as → ἀλήθεια (Plat.Phaed., 99e ff.; cf. Heracl.Fr., 1 [I, 150, 1 ff., Diels5]), though it can also stand in confrontation λόγοσ/ἔργον (Thuc., II, 65, 9; Anaxag. Fr., 7 [II, 36, 4, Diels5]) and even antithesis; ἐπιστήμη (Plat.Symp., 211a; Soph., 265c); → ἀρετή (Aristot.Eth. Nic., I, 6, p. 1098a, 7–16; Plut. De Virt. Morali, 3 [II, 441c]: ἀρετή is λόγος and vice versa); → ἀνάγκη (Leucipp. Fr., 2 [II, 81, 5 f., Diels5]); → κόσμος (→ III, 873; 878); → νόμος (II, p. 169, 28f.; III, p. 4, 2 ff., v. Arnim M. Ant., IV, 4; Plot.Enn., III, 2, 4; Heracl.Fr., 114 together with Fr., 2 [I, 176, 5 ff. and 151, 1 ff., Diels5]); → ζωή (Plot.Enn.,VI, 7, 11); → εἰ̂δος and → μορφή (ibid., I, 6, 2 f.; VI, 7, 10 f.); → φύσις; → πνευ̂μα, esp. in the Stoa (λόγος του̂ θεου̂ == πνευ̂μα σωματικόν, II, p. 310, 24 f., v. Arnim); → θεός (Max. Tyr., 27, 8; God is πάντων τω̂ν ὄντων λόγος, Orig.Cels., V, 14). λόγος and ἀριθμός are also related (Ps.-Epicharm. Fr., 56 [I, 208, 5 f., Diels5]). Acc. to Pythagorean teaching, the nature of things is expressed in numerical relations, and this gives us a close approximation to λόγος (cf. Plut.Comm. Not., 35 [II, 1077b]); Simpl. in Aristot. == Schol. in Aristot. (ed. C. A. Brandis [ 1836]), p. 67a, 38 ff.: ἀριθμοὺς μὲν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ λόγους ἐν τῃ̂ ὕλῃ ὠνόμαζον τὰ αἴτια ταυ̂τα τω̂ν ὄντων ᾑ̂ ὄντα (cf. Plot.Enn., V, 1, 5).

If one may put it thus, the imaginary basic meaning, the ambiguity or wealth of relations (→ 84) sustained by an ultimate unity of sense intrinsic to λόγος, makes the word a philosophical term κατʼ ἐξοχήν, and displays the philosophical content which from the very first underlies the very nature of the Greek language.

It should not be overlooked, however, that for the Greeks λόγος is very different from an address or a word of creative power.44 No matter how we construe it as used by the Greeks,45 it stands in contrast to the “Word” of the OT and NT. Naturally, concrete utterance is part of its content, especially when it is employed in an emphatic sense, as in human words of command (Hdt., IX, 4; Soph.Oed. Col., 66), divine or oracular sayings (Pind.Pyth., 4, 59), λόγοι μαντικοί (Plat.Phaedr., 275b), or philosophical dialogue. But there is implied the connected rational element in speech, which seeks to discover the issue itself in the demonstration,46 as distinct from the harmony and beauty of sound, for which the Greek uses ἔπος or ῥη̂μα, and especially in contrast to ῥη̂μα as the individual and more emotional expression or saying, though this does, of course, fall into a pattern, so that the fact of speech is the essential thing,47 and ῥη̂μα thus denotes the word as expressed will,48 as distinct from the explicatory element in λόγος According to the acute definition of Aristot. (De Interpretatione, p. 16b, 26), λόγος is a φωνὴ σημαντική, a “significant utterance.” Expressions like τί λέγεις; (“what is the meaning of what you say?”) point to the fact that the essential thing is, not the saying, but the meaning. λέγειν cannot be used for “to command,” or “to address,” or “to utter a word of creative power.” λόγος is a statement (ἀπόφανσις, ibid, p. 17a, 22) whether something ὑπάρχει or μὴ ὑπάρχει (p. 17a, 23). Hence the explanatory words are ἀποφαίνεσθαι (to cause something to be seen, p. 17a, 27); δηλου̂ν (p. 17a, 16; cf. Pol., I, 2, p. 1253a, 14: δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῳ̂ δηλου̂ν ἐστιν); (λέγειν) τι κατά τινος (p. 17a, 21;). “This causing of something to be seen for what it is, and the possibility of being orientated thereby, are what Aristotle defines as ‘word’ (λόγος).”49

It simply illustrates this specific use if in the Gk. magic pap. λόγος (cf. → πρα̂ξις) is an important tt. for the magical song or prayer or incantation of powerful demons, Preis. Zaub., I, 156; III, 3 and 17.50 In this connection we may cite some wholly nonGreek meanings of which there are no examples whatever in secular Gk. Thus Philo speaks of the ζηλωτικὸς λόγος, Leg. All., III,242, the “spirit of zeal,” and Jesus in Mt. 8:16 ἐξέβαλεν τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ. The Jew Aristobulus is also using a singular turn of phrase when he has the word λόγος in the Jewish sense for that which is spoken essentially and primarily: Eus.Praep. Ev., XIII, 12, 3: δει̂ γὰρ λαμβάνειν τὴν θείαν φωνὴν οὐ ῥητὸν λόγον ἀλλʼ ἔργων κατασκευάς.

For the creative Word of God in the OT sense cf. Sir. 42:15: ἐν λόγοις κυρίου τὰ ἔργα αὐτου̂; in contrast, the classical Gk. λόγος concept is set in characteristic antithesis to ἔργον, cf. Thuc., II, 65, 9; Anaxag.Fr., 7 (II, 36, 4 f., Diels5). It is interesting that Wis. and the LXX do not use ῥη̂μα for the Word of creation and revelation; it is obviously too narrow. Instead, they have the more profound and comprehensive λόγος, though in the OT, as later in the NT (→ n. 144), λόγος and ῥη̂μα are closer to one another (cf. the non-Gk. combinations of the two in PhiloPoster. C., 102; Leg. All., III, 173; Cl. Al.Strom., VI, 3, 34, 3: κυριακὴ φωνὴ λόγος ἀσχημάτιστος· γὰρτου̂ λόγου δύναμις, ῥη̂μα κυρίου φωτεινόν).

2.     The Development of the λόγος Concept in the Greek World.

a. The Two Sides of the Concept. We shall pursue the distinctive Gk. use according to two aspects which are still significantly undivided at the startingpoint in Heraclitus (→ b.).

First, we have in view the use of λόγος for word, speech, utterance, revelation, not in the sense of something proclaimed and heard, but rather in that of something displayed, clarified, recognised, and understood; λόγος as the rational power of calculation in virtue of which man can see himself and his place in the cosmos; λόγος as the indication of an existing and significant content which is assumed to be intelligible; λόγος as the content itself in terms of its meaning and law, its basis and structure. Secondly, we have in view λόγος as a metaphysical reality and an established term in philosophy and theology, from which there finally develops in later antiquity, under alien influences, a cosmological entity and hypostasis of the deity, a δεύτερος θεός.

It is presupposed as self-evident by the Greek that there is in things, in the world and its course, a primary λόγος, an intelligible and recognisable law, which then makes possible knowledge and understanding in the human λόγος. But this λόγος is not taken to be something which is merely grasped theoretically. It claims a man. It determines his true life and conduct. The λόγος is thus the norm (→ νόμος). For the Greek, knowledge is always recognition of a law. Therewith it is also fulfilment of this law.

b. Heraclitus. Because the same λόγος constitutes the being of both the cosmos and man, it is the connecting principle which forms the bridge and possibility of understanding51 1. between man and the world, and also between men (in their political order, → 82), 2. between man and God, and finally in later antiquity 3. between this world and the world above. It is in Heraclitus52 (Fr., 1 [I, 150, 1 ff., Diels5]) that the λόγος is first stated to be that which establishes man in his true being in virtue of this interconnection (sense c. → 78): του̂ δὲ λόγου του̂δʼ ἐόντος ἀεὶ ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἀκου̂σαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρω̂τον· γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν ἐοίκασι, πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγευ̂μαι κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ θράζων ὅκως ἔχει Cf. also Fr., 2 (I, 151, 1 ff., Diels5): διὸ δει̂ ἕπεσθαι τω̂ι κοινω̂ι· ξυνὸς γὰρ κοινός. του̂ λόγου δʼ ἐόντος ξυνου̂ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. The λόγος is here the word. speech, or content of speech or book, but also what is meant by the word or in the work, the truth; for only of it can one say that it is eternally valid (ἀεὶ ἐόντος), and that everything takes place in its sense. Philosophical knowledge, the λόγος or → νου̂ς → σύνεσις, is thus for Heraclitus the means to evoke the words and works of men. Both speech and action follow from it. This λόγος of Heraclitus is to be understood and interpreted as an oracular word. For men are bound by the λόγος and yet they do not see it. They live as though there were an ἰδία πρόνησις (Fr., 2). Heraclitus connects this λόγος with the ξυνόν (→ κοινὸς λόγος), Fr., 2. It is the transcendent and lasting order in which eternal flux occurs, binding the individual to the whole. It is the cosmic law53 which is comprehended by the λόγος which grows in the soul (Fr., 115 [I, 176, 10, Diels5]: ψυχη̂ς ἐστι λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὔξων, cf. Fr., 45 [I, 161, 1 ff., Diels5]); as such it is the opposite of every individual or private δόξα. The deepest ground of the → ψυξή, which none can wholly plumb, is the λόγος. “He who hears the λόγος does not merely accept a claim which springs out of the situation and encounters him. He is aware of a claim, but in such a way that he truly understands it only if he realises that basically it is he himself who must raise the claim to transcend the ἰδία φρόνησις,54 Fr., 50 (I, 161, 16 f., Diels5): οὐκ ἐμου̂, ἀλλὰ του̂ λόγου ἀκούσαντας55 ὁμολογει̂ν σοφόν ἐστιν ἓν πάντα εἰ̂ναι.

c. The Sophists. After Heraclitus the word develops in Gk. thought, and the unity of meaning which distinguishes Heraclitus is disrupted. By way of the sense of reckoning and gradual synonymity with → νου̂ς, the λόγος now becomes predominantly the rational power set in man, the power of speech and thought. In political life it plays a decisive part as the means of persuasion and direction. Only in Stoicism does it reemerge as a universal, cosmic, and religious principle.

The great representatives of this development are the Sophists, who not only treated the λόγος apart from any norm or connection with given interests or situations even to the τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείσσω ποιει̂ν (Plat.Ap., 18b),56 but who were also the first to work out a theory57 of the λόγος.

In the political life of 4th and 5th century democracy, which was strongly marked by ratio, the λόγος naturally took on great significance. In Helenae Encomium, 8 (Fr., 11 [II, 290, 17 ff., Diels5]), Gorg. extols the psychagogic power of the λόγος, which is here almost personified:58 λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτωι σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτωι θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελει̂· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παυ̂σαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελει̂ν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξη̂σαι, and the one mastered by it is a δου̂λος of the λόγος (cf. Plat.Phileb., 58b). The λόγος may take the most varied turns in detail, e.g., a pedagogic in Isoc. Or., 3, 7: τούτῳ, (sc. τῳ̂ λόγῳ) καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς ἐξελέγχομεν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐγκωμιάζομεν, and even a creatively cultural, ibid., 3, 6 ff.; Or., 15, 254: καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ διʼ ἡμω̂ν μεμηχανημένα λόγος ἡμι̂ν ἐστιν συγκατασκευάσας. Only the λόγος makes possible the political life which raises us above the level of the beasts. All cultural achievements are owed to it: οὐ μόνον του̂ θηριωδω̂ς ζη̂ν ἀπηλλάγημεν ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις ᾠκίσαμεν καὶ νόμους ἐθέμεθα καὶ τέχνας εὕρομεν (loc. cit.).59 Ratio, oratio, and normative force are comprised in the term: οὑ̂τος γὰρ περὶ τω̂ν δικαίων καὶ τω̂ν ἀδίκων καὶ τω̂ν καλω̂ν καὶ τω̂ν αἰσχρω̂ν ἐνομοθέτησεν. Thus the ψυχη̂ς ἀγαθη̂ς καὶ πιστη̂ς εἴδωλον is finally ψυχη̂ς ἀγαθη̂ς καὶ πιστη̂ς εἴδωλον (ibid., 255).

d. Socrates and Plato. As Socrates and Plato transcend the more individualistic λόγος of the Sophists by pursuing this way to its logical end, a new and deeper conception of the λόγος arises. This is the thought, widespread in the Gk. world, of the power of the λόγος, if only it is linked to the κοινὸς λόγος, to establish fellowship by making possible agreement on the basis of the matter, ὁμολογία.60 The constantly recurring τί λέγεις; in the Socratic dialogues expresses the fact that here common speech with its words and concepts is recognised, or presupposed, as the common basis. The λόγος as the basic fact in all life in society is the decisive point in the politics of Socrates and Plato, just as there is a kind of pre-existent harmony between the λόγος of the thinking soul and the λόγος of things. Hence man must be on guard lest he become an enemy of the word as another might become the enemy of men. No greater misfortune can befall a man, and both hatred of the word and enmity against men proceed from the same disposition (Plat.Phaed., 89d; 90d e: Hence μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τω̂ν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἰ̂ναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μα̂λλον ὅτι ἡμει̂ς οὔπω ὑγιω̂ς ἔχομεν …, 99e: ἔδοξε δή μοι χρη̂ναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπει̂ν τω̂ν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν). The truth is attained when the λόγος interprets phenomena; but the λόγος must proceed from them. The Socratic-Platonic understanding and use of λόγος rests on this duality. λόγος is thinking as the διάλογος of the soul with itself (Plat.Soph., 263e: διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν μὲν ἐντὸς τη̂ς ψυχη̂ς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνη̂ς γιγνόμενος, cf. Theaet., 189e). Here Plato simply expresses philosophically the twofold content found in the word itself. By contrast with the eristic and destructive λόγος of the Sophists, which merely represents what is always The possible failure of the λόγος, the τω̂ν λόγων αὐτω̂ν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος (Plat.Phileb., 15d), since it is not oriented ἀφθόνως to the matter, the λόγος is here (Plat.Soph., 259c–264) developed as τω̂ν ὄντων ἔν τι γενω̂ν (Soph., 260a), and as such it makes philosophy possible because it is linked to being as to a great κοινωνία. λόγος and κοινωνία belong closely together, Soph. 262c (cf. 259e): τότω δʼ ἥρμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς πρώτη συμπλοκή. The συμπλοκή of ὀνόματα and ῥήματα, however small, at once produces a λόγος which has its essence in the fact that it does not merely speak (ὀνομάζει) words but τι περαίνει—262d—that it says (λέγει) something, a matter, a being (and therewith a sense). As ἀληθὴς or πιστὸς λόγος (Dio Chrys.Or., 45, 3), it expresses what is as it is.61 Once again, then, δηλου̂ν and σημαίνειν are correlative to λόγος (Soph., 261d/e).

Thought, word, matter,62 nature, being and norm (cf. the Identity of being and thought in Parm.) are all brought into a comprehensive interrelation in the λόγος concept. Thus Plato in Crito, 46b/d can say of the λόγοι of Socrates that they were not just λόγοι ἕνεκα λόγου, a mere speaking, nor were they παιδιά and φλυαρία (46d), but they were essence and deed, since they stood up even in face of death.63

e. Aristotle. Aristotle sums up once again the classical understanding of human existence in his statement: λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τω̂ν ζῴων, Polit., I, 2, p. 1253a, 9 f. Man has the word in the twofold sense that what he does and does not do are determined by the word or understanding, and that he himself speaks the word, achieving understanding and speech64 (Aristot.Eth. Nic., I, 6, p. 1098a, 4 f.: τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον The specific ἔργον ἀνθρώπου is the ψυχη̂ς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον (ibid., a 7).65 The λόγος is the source of the unique ἀρετή (Eth. Nic., II, 6, p. 1106b, 36 ff.) of man,66 and consequently of his εὐδαιμονία.

3.     The λόγος in Hellenism.

a. Stoicism. In Stoicism67 λόγος is a term for the ordered and teleologically orientated nature of the world (Diog. L., VII, 74 [149] λόγος, καθʼ ἃν κόσμος διεξάγεται). It is thus equated with the concept of God (→ θεός, III, 75; cf. Zeno in Diog. L., VII, 68 [134] [== I, p. 24, 7 f., v. Arnim] τὸ δὲ ποιου̂ν τὸν ἐν αὐτῃ̂ [sc. τῃ̂ ὕλῃ] λόγον τὸν θεόν), with πρόνοια, εἱμαρμένη, with → κόσμος, → νόμος, → φύσις—acc. to Chrysipp. εἱμαρμένη is the Διὸς λόγος (Plut.Stoic. Rep., 47 [II, 1056c]) or του̂ κόσμου λόγος or λόγος τω̂ν ἐν κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων (II, 264, 18 ff., v. Arnim).68 As such it can no longer be rendered actively as concrete speech which is uttered on a meaningful basis, as in Socratic-Platonic philosophy, It can be identified only passively with the (cosmic) law of reason. God is πάντων τω̂ν ὄντων λόγος, Orig.Cels., V, 14, and the basis of the unity of this world (εἱ̂ς λόγος ταυ̂τα κοσμω̂ν καὶ μία πρόνοια ἐπιτροπεύουσα, Plut.Is. et Os., 67 [II, 377 f.]; τὴν οὐσίαν τω̂ν ὅλων διοικω̂ν λόγος, M. Ant., VI, 1). By assimilation to popular religion this world logos is equated with Zeus, as in the well-known hymn of Cleanthes, Fr., 537 (I, p. 122, 7, v. Arnim): ὥσθʼ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα. It is the principle which creates the world, i.e., which orders and constitutes it ( του̂ κόσμου λόγος, Chrysipp. [II, p. 264, 18 f., v. Arnim]; M. Ant., IV, 29, 3), which makes it a ζῳ̂ον λογικόν (II, p. 191, 34 f., v. Arnim). It is the power which extends throughout matter ( διʼ ὅλης τη̂ς οὐσίας διήκων λόγος, M. Ant., V, 32) and works immanently in all things. The world is a grand unfolding of the λόγος, which is, of course, represented materially (Diog. L., VII, 35 [56]: πα̂ν γὰρ τὸ ποιου̂ν σω̂μά ἐστιν) as → πυ̂ρ, → πνευ̂μα (II, p. 310, 24 f., v. Arnim), or αἰθήρ. But as the organic power which fashions unformed and inorganic matter, which gives growth to plants and movement to animals, it is the λόγος σπερματικός (Zeno [I, p. 28, 26, v. Arnim]). That is, it is a seed which unfolds itself, and this seed is by nature reason. As λόγος ὀρθός, the cosmic law, the → νόμος of the world as well as the individual, it gives men the power of knowledge (Pos. in Sext. Emp.Math., VII, 93: τω̂ν ἅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενου̂ς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι του̂ λόγου, cf. Diog. L., VII, 52) and of moral action (M. Ant., IV, 4, 1: προστακτικὸς τω̂ν ποιητέων μὴ λόγος κοινός). As all powers proceed from the λόγος, they all return to it again, M. Ant., IV, 21, 2: ψυχαὶμεταβάλλουσι καὶ χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται εἰς τὸν τω̂ν ἅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι. The particular logos of man is only part of the great general logos, V, 27; Epict.Diss., III, 3; M. Ant., VII, 53: κατὰ τὸν κοινὸν θεοι̂ς καὶ ἀνθρώποις λόγον, which achieves awareness in man, so that through it God and man, or the sage or philosopher as the true man who alone has the ὀρθὸς λόγος and who thus lives ἀκολουθω̂ν τῃ̂ φύσει (PhiloEbr., 34) are combined into a great κόσμος (II, p. 169, 28 f., v. Arnim: κοινωνίαν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους [sc. ἀνθρώποις καὶ θεοι̂ς] διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος. The duality of λόγος as reason and speech (opp. πάθος) develops in Stoic doctrine inwardly into the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and outwardly into the λόγος προφορικός (Sext. Emp.Pyrrh. Hyp., I, 65). An extension of content signficant for later development is to be found in the equation of λόγος with φύσις ( κοινὸς τη̂ς φύσεως λόγος, II, p. 269, 13, v. Arnim; M. Ant., IV, 29, 3) as a creative power. In the period which followed this aspect was increasingly emphasised, e.g., in Plut.Is. et Os., 45 (II, 369a): δημιουργὸν ὕλης ἕνα λόγον καὶ μίαν πρόνοιαν. In the Stoic λόγος the rational power of order and the vital power of conception are merged in one (Diog. L., VII, 68 [135 f.] == II, 180, 2 ff., v. Arnim).

b. Neo-Platonism. In debate with Stoicism Neo-platonism69 championed a developed logos doctrine. Here, too, the λόγος is a shaping power which lends form and life to things and is thus closely related to εἰ̂δος and → μορφή (Plot.Enn., I, 6, 2. 3. 6; III, 3, 6; IV, 3, 10), → φω̂ς (ibid., II, 4, 5) and → ζωή (ibid., VI, 7, 11: εἰ δὴ κατὰ λόγον δει̂ τὸ ποιου̂ν εἰ̂ναι ὡς μορφου̂ν, τί ἂν εἴη; ψυχὴ ποιει̂ν πυ̂ρ δυναμένη· του̂τό δʼ ἐστι ζωὴ καὶ λόγος, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω). Life is artistically fashioning power. τίς λόγος; it is οἱ̂ον ἔκλαμψις (irradiation) ἐξ ἀμφοι̂ν, νου̂ καὶ ψυχη̂ς (ibid., III, 2, 16). Where it works, everything is permeated (λελόγωται), i.e., shaped (μεμόρφωται) by the λόγος, III, 2, 16. Nature is life and λόγος and the working power of form, III, 8, 2: … τὴν φύσιν εἰ̂ναι λόγον, ὃς ποιει̂ λόγον ἄλλον γέννημα αὑτου̂. Indeed, the whole world is λόγος, and all that is in it is λόγος, III, 2, 2, the former as the pure power of form in the intelligible world, the latter in admixture with matter to the final λόγος κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν τὴν ὁρωμένην ἔσχατος ἤδη καὶ νεκρός, which οὐκέτι ποιει̂ν δύναται ἄλλον, and which was unknown to Stoicism in contrast to Neo-platonism, III, 8, 2. Thus Plot., like John’s Gospel, can say in III, 2, 15: ἀρχὴ οὐ̂ν λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος. Sometimes this is regarded as a unity, an emanation from → Νου̂ς, III, 2, 2: του̂το δὲ λόγος ἐκ νου̂ ῥυείς. τὸ γὰρ ἀπορρέον ἐκ νου̂ λόγος, καὶ ἀεὶ.—not in singular historicity—ἀπορρει̂ ἕως ἂν ᾐ̂ παρὼν ἐν τοι̂ς οὐ̂σι λόγοςτου̂ δὲ λόγου ἐπʼ αὐτοι̂ς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένουτου̂ δὲ λόγου ἐπʼ αὐτοι̂ς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου, sometimes as a plurality by which it brings into effect the multiplicity of phenomena; for it is πολὺς καὶ πα̂ς, V, 3, 16, εἱ̂ς and πολύς, VI, 7, 14. Indeed, the one λόγος divides into warring opposites, III, 2, 16: ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἕνα του̂τον λόγον ἐξ ἐναντίων λόγων εἰ̂ναι ἕνα τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῳ̂ καὶ οἱ̂ον οὐσίαν τη̂ς τοιαύτης ἐναντιώσεως, the antithesis securing its consistence and essentiality. But the formative principle is not, as in Stoicism, τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐν σπέρμασιν; it is τὸ μὴ ὁρώμενον· του̂το δὲ ἀριθμὸς (ideal measure) καὶ λόγος, V, 1, 5. the μέτρον, II, 4, 8. By his λόγος man can break free from the φύσεως γοητεία IV, 4, 43 f., and attain to the λόγος ἀληθής, the truth of being, IV, 4, 12; VI, 7, 4 ff. But the human λόγος does not lead to an ἀκούειν. It is the ἐκ τω̂ν λόγων ἐπὶ τὴν θέανπαιδαγωγω̂ν λόγος, VI, 9, 4. As such it is not supreme or final. For what one sees in mystic vision is οὐκέτι λόγος, ἀλλὰ μει̂ζον λόγου καὶ πρὸ λόγου, VI, 9, 10.

c. The Mysteries. In connection with deities of revelation the λόγος takes on esp. in the Hellen. mysteries an enhanced religious significance as → ἱερὸς λόγος “sacred history,” “holy and mysterious doctrine,” “revelation,” in a sense not found elsewhere in secular Gk. The ἱερός here belongs essentially to the content and is not just traditional. Hdt., II, 51 already appeals to a ἱρόν τινα λόγον of the Cabiri mysteries in Samothrace (Syr. Dea, 15, 4); and we hear of sacred history in the Dionysus cult, among the Pythagoreans (Iambl.Vit. Pyth., 28, 146: Πυθαγόραν συντάξαι τὸν περὶ θεω̂ν λόγον, ὃν καὶ ἱερὸν διὰ του̂το ἐπέγραψεν), cf. the ἱερὸς λόγος of the Orphics70 (Suid., s.v. ʼΟρφεύς, No. 654 [Adler]). In the Isis hymn of Andros, v. 12 (ed. W. Peek [1930]) there is ref. to the sacred doctrine of the mysteries of Isis which induces pious awe in the initiate, and in Plut.Is. et Os., 2 (II, 351 f.) in connection with theological logos speculation, we read of the ἱερὸς λόγος, ὃν θεὸς [sc. Isis] συνάγει καὶ συντίθησι, καὶ παραδίδωσι (!) τοι̂ς τελουμένοις <διὰ> θειώσεως, and for which δεισιδαιμονία and περιεργία are not enough, 3 (II, 352b). Osiris is the half personified λόγος created by Isis, a spiritual reflection of the world (Is. et Os., 54). In the ῾Ερμου̂ του̂ τρισμεγίστου ἱερὸς λόγος (Corp. Herm., III heading [acc. to Reitzenstein Poim.]) Hermes tells how by God’s mercy he became λόγος and hence υἱὸς θεου̂. As a special gift of God (XII, 12. 13) and as λόγος τέλειος this ἱερὸς λόγος71 leads to the mystery of union with the deity (IX, 1; XII, 12). Indeed, the λόγος can even be equivalent to → μυστήριον or τελετή (XIII, 13b: the λόγος is the παράδοσις of παλιγγενεσία), and the initiate himself is the personified λόγος θεου̂, cf. I, 6 (Reitzenstein Poim.): τὸ ἐν σοὶ βλέπον (!) καὶ ἀκου̂ον λόγος κυρίου ἐστίν, which extols God in the regenerate and in the λόγος offers Him all things as λογικὴ → θυσία, XIII, 18. 21.

λόγος as prayer, Aesch.Choeph., 509; in connection with → εὐχή it plays a certain role in mystical speculation inasmuch as it is the only worthy way to enter into relation with God, cf. Sallust., 16 (ed. a.d. Nock, [1926]): αἱ μὲν χωρὶς θυσιω̂ν εὐχαὶ λόγοι μόνον εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ μετὰ θυσιω̂ν ἔμψυχοι λόγοι· του̂ μὲν λόγου τὴν ζωὴν δυναμου̂ντος, τη̂ς δὲ ζωη̂ς τὸν λόγον ψυχούσης). Apollonius of Tyana (in Eus.Dem. Ev., III, 3, 11) teaches that all genuine prayer must be offered through the λόγος; true honouring of God takes place μόνῳτῳ̂ κρείττονι λόγῳ (λέγω δὲ τῳ̂ μὴ διὰ στόματος ἰόντι), and can be known only λόγῳ (Schol. on Epic. Sententia, 1 in Diog. L., X, 31 [139]: τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς). The λόγος shows man the upward way, Max. Tyr., XI, 10: ἐκλαθόμενος μὲν τω̂ν κάτω οἰμωγω̂νκαὶ δοξω̂ν …, ἐπιτρέψας δὲ τη̂ν ἡγεμονίαν αὐτους λόγῳ ἀληθει̂ καὶ ἔρωτι ἐρρωμένῳ· τῳ̂ μὲν λόγῳ φράζοντι ᾑ̂ χρὴ ἰέναι …, Plot.Enn., VI, 9, 4: παιδαγωγω̂ν λόγος. On this way the λόγος ends in mystical σιωπή, Philostr.Vit. Ap., I, 1: διδάσκαλον εὑρὼν σιωπη̂ς λόγον. Cf. VI, 11 (245): διδάσκαλον εὑρὼν σιωπη̂ς λόγον, Plot.Enn., III, 8, 6: γὰρ ἐν ψυχῃ̂ λαμβάνει λόγῳ οὔσῃ, τί ἂν ἄλλο λόγος σιωπω̂ν εἴη; In Plot. God is λόγου κρείττων, and in Plut.Is. et Os., 75 (II, 381b) φωνη̂ς γὰρ θει̂ος λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστι.72

d. The Hermes-Logos-Theology; Hermeticism. Almost all aspects of the philosophical logos concept occur in Gk. theology, personified and comprehended in the figure of the god Hermes73 and others. If in Gk. theology Helios, Pan, Isis etc.74 are the λόγος as well as Hermes, there is no implied incarnation of the λόγος but the equation of a revealing and cosmogonic principle with one of the deities of popular religion, This is the kind of identification which is often found in, e.g., the theological system of Stoicism (Zeus-Λόγος, Isis-θω̂ς, Isis-Δικαιοσύνη, Isis-Γένεσις, etc.). In other words, a concept is hypostatised as a god, or identified with a god. There is no question of the divine word of power and creation becoming man, incarnate. This kind of Hermes-Logos-theology is to be found in Cornut.Theol. Graec., 16 (cf. Diog. L., VII, 1, 36 [49]: τυγξάνει δὲ ʼΕρμη̂ς λόγος ὤν, ὃν ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς ἡμα̂ς ἐξ οὐρανου̂ οἱ θεοί, μόνον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τω̂ν ἐπὶ γη̂ς ζῴων λογικὸν ποιήσαντεςἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σῴζειν μα̂λλον γέγονεν λόγος,75 ὅθεν καὶ τὴν Yγίειαν αὐτῳ̂ συνῴκισανπαραδέδοται δὲ καὶ κήρυξ θεω̂ν καὶ διαγγέλλειν αὐτὸν ἔφασαν τὰ παρʼ ἐκείνων τοι̂ς ἀνθρώποις, κη̂ρυξ μέν, ἐπειδὴ διὰ φωνη̂ς γεγωνου̂ παριστᾳ̂ τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σημαινόμενα ται̂ς ἀκοαι̂ς, ἄλλελος δέ, ἐπεὶ τὸ βούλημα τω̂ν θεσ̀ν γιγνώσκομεν ἐκ τω̂ν ἐνδεδομένων ἡμι̂ν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐννοιω̂ν. New and significant here is the role of Hermes as a mediator and revealer who as κη̂ρυξ and αγγελος declares and makes known to us the will of the gods. He thus has a soteriological role in so far as the λόγος is present for σώ̂ζειν.76 Indeed. Hermes is the great power of conception and creation, the λόγος σπερματικός of the Stoa, honoured under the image of the Phallos:77 γόνιμος λόγος καὶ τέλειός ἐστιν, and he finally rises to the level of the comprehensive κοινὸς λόγος: διὰ δὲ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτὸν εἰ̂ναι καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔν τε τοι̂ς ἀνθρώποις πα̂σι καὶ ἐν τοι̂ς θεοι̂ς. It is interesting to see how in later antiquity the λόγος concept, which derives originally from the cultural and intellectual sphere, sinks back increasingly into the sphere of the natural which it was once fashioned to oppose. Thus in Hellenistic mysticism λόγος is essentially a cosmic and creative potency, the guide and agent of knowledge, increasingly represented as a religious doctrine of salvation, the revealer of what is hidden.78

Under the influence of ancient Egyptian theology this philosophical and noetic concept ends, therefore, in the mystico-religious speculations of Hermeticism79 concerning creation and revelation. The λόγος comes forth from → Νου̂ς (Corp. Herm., I, 5a: the ἐκ του̂ φωτὸς προελθὼν λόγος ἅγιος ἐπέβη τῃ̂ ὑγρᾳ̂ φύσει). It is the son of God (I, 6: ἐκ νοὸς φωτεινὸς λόγος is the υἱὸς Θεους). It brings order and form into the world as its δημιουργός: Suid., s.v. ʼΕρμη̂ς, Τρισμέγιστος, No. 3038 (Adler): γὰρ λόγος αὐτους παντέλειος ὢν καὶ γόνιμος καὶ δημιουργικός, ἐν γονίμῳ φύσει πεσὼν καὶ γονίμῳ ὕδατι, ἔγκυον τὸ ὕδωπ ἐποίησε. Almost all the divine attributes are ascribed to it as such. But as the sum of all the δυνάμεις of the supreme deity it is still an intermediary making contact between God and matter, and also between God, the father of the λόγος, and created being, man. The idea of an intermediate λόγος is further developed in the concept of the father-son relation, cf. Schol. on Ael. Arist., III, p. 564, 19 ff., Dindorf. Thus the λόγος is also the son of Hermes, related to Hermes as Hermes is to the supreme deity, Zeus. In accordance with this intermediate position in creation Horus/Osiris in Plut.Is. et Os., 53 (II, 373a/b) is not καθαρός and εἰλικρινής, οἱ̂ος πατὴρ λόγος αὐτὸς καθʼ ἑαυτὸν ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, ἀλλὰ νενοθευμένος τῃ̂ ὕλῃ διὰ τὸ σωματικόν There is a graded connection which in the Hermetic conception of a world organism is elucidated in the thought of the image (→ εἰκών): The λόγος is an εἰκών of God, and man is an image of the λόγος, Cl. Al.Strom., V, 14, 91, 5: ἐκὼν μὲν γὰρ θεου̂ λόγος θει̂ος καὶ βασιλικός, ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθής, εἰκὼν θʼ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νου̂ς.

The λόγος is not only God’s son. It is also λόγος θεου̂, Orig.Cels., VI, 60: λέγοντες τὸν μὲν προσεξω̂ς δημιουργὸν εἰ̂ναι τὸν υἱὸν του̂ θεου̂ λόγον καὶ ὡσπερεὶ αὐτουργὸν του̂ κόσμου, τὸν δὲ πατέρα του̂ λόγου τῳ̂ προστεταχέναι τῳ̂ υἱῳ̂ ἑαυτου̂ λόγῳ ποιη̂σαι τὸν κόσμον εἰ̂ναι πρώτως δημιουργόν.

Together with the → βουλὴ θεους and the κόσμος, the λόγος forms a divine trinity inasmuch as it is the divine seed which the βουλὴ θεους fashions into the visible world (→ I, 634).

4.     The λόγοι of Philo of Alexandria.

The Logos concept plays a considerable role in Philo.80 This is shown at once by the fact that he uses it over 1300 times.81 To the common use there corresponds a confusing vacillation of meanings82 which raises such a distinctive problem in relation to Philo. E. Schwartz83 can deny his derivation of the term from Gk. philosophy: he regards λόγος as at heart and in essence a jewish term (“Word of God”).84 L. Cohn,85 on the other hand, declares that the Stoic λόγος τη̂ς φύσεως is the root of Philo’s λόγος θεους (or Θει̂ος λόγος) in the sense of the “divine reason,” the “epitome of divine wisdom.”

The vacillation is naturally due to the synthesising tendency in Philo’s attempted uniting of Jewish religion and Gk. philosophical speculation. One can do justice to it only if one first considers the various aspects and understandings of the Philonic concept apart, not trying to harmonise them, but separating the incompatible Gk. and non-Gk. elements. In the main it is only the divine logos which is here at issue. The essential features of this cannot be explained in terms of the development of the Gk. logos concept. Even if we cannot be sure of the detailed roots of this new usage, they are manifestly non-Gk. The term is taken from the academic vocabulary of Hellenistic philosophy.86 But it is decisively refashioned in a new, very different, and primarily mythologising direction.

This λόγος θεου̂ or θει̂ος λόγος, as the new use with the gen shows, is no longer God Himself as in the Stoa (I, p. 24, 7; II, p. 111, 10, v. Arnim; cf. also Orig.Cels., V, 24: τω̂ν πάντων λόγος ἐστὶ κατὰ μὲν Κέλσον αὐτὸς θεός, κατὰ δεὶ ἡμα̂ς υἱο̂ς αὐτου̂) It is an ἔργον of God (Sacr. AC., 65). It is a god, but of the second rank (Leg. All., II, 86: τὸ δὲ γενικώτατὸν ἐστιν θεός, καὶ δεύτερος θεου̂ λόγος, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα λόγῳ μόνον ὑπάρχει). As such it is called the → εἰκών (Spec. Leg., I, 81: λόγος δʼ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεους, διʼ οὑ̂ σύμπα̂ κόσμος ἐδημιουργει̂το) of the supreme God, and in Philo’s doctrine of creation it takes on basic significance not only as ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα87 but also as ὄργανον θεους (Migr. Abr., 6; Cher., 127). With Σοφία88 God has begotten the κόσμος νοητός as His first-born son89 (Agric., 51: τὸν ὀρθὸν αὑτου̂ λόγον καὶ πρωτόγονον → υἱόν). This is equated with the λόγος (Op. Mund., 24: οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι [τις] τὸν νοητὸν κὸσμον εἰ̂ναι ἢθεου̂ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιου̂ντος). Thus the λόγος is a mediating figure which comes forth from God and establishes a link between the remotely transcendent God and the world or man, and yet which also represents man to God as a high-priest (Gig., 52) and advocate (Vit. Mos., II, 133). i.e., as a personal Mediator, and not just in terms of the genuinely Gk. ἀναλογία (Plat.Tim., 31c; Plot.Enn., III, 3, 6).

As the κόσμος νοητός it is the sum and locus (Op. Mund., 20) of the creative powers of God, His → δυνάμεις (Fug., 101), the ideas, the individual logoi90 whereby this visible world is fashioned in detail and also maintained in its ordered life (Rer. Div. Her., 188). As δίοπο̂ Καὶ κυβερνήτης του̂ παντός (Cher., 36) it guides the world in exactly the same way as the Stoic νόμος or λόγος θύσεως.

Now W. Theiler91 has shown that the λόγος as the sphere of divine ideas, the νόησις θεου̂, and also as the ὄργανον θεου̂, belongs to the pre-neo-platonic tradition. Yet two things are non-Gk. in this whole concept. The first is the linguistic form with a gen. or adj.: θεους or θει̂ος. This gives the term its distinctive reality, and, as Schwartz has rightly pointed out, marks it off from Gk. usage, even if one cannot always render it “Word of God.” The second is the fact that a universal concept is conceived of personally92 (cf. → Σοφία → Πνευ̂μα, → Νου̂ς93 Closely linked with this is the idea of relationship or sonship, which is expressed in metaphors taken from the sphere of procreation (Agric., 51; Det. Pot. Ins., 54), and which applies both to the manner of the origin of the λόγος and to the mode of its operation, i.e., its wedding of the soul (Spec. Leg., II, 29 ff.) and the fact that it is the father of the daughters ἐπιστη̂μαι and ἀρεταί (Gig., 17).

The anthropomorphic view of the world expressed in the image of putting on the cosmos like a garment (Fug., 110) is certainly non-Gk., though it is also non-Jewish too, and seems to point rather in the direction of oriental and Egyptian theology.94

5.     Hellenistic Logos Speculation and the NT.

There is a great difference between Hellenistic Logos speculation and the NT λόγος.

This is shown first by the pronouncedly rational and intellectual character of the λόγλος, and by the fact that it occurs in very different connections and more precise senses in profane Gk. To the Christian, “word,” “speech,” “reason,” and “law” in the absolute, being in some way expressions of man’s self-understanding, are not important in themselves. The only important thing is what God has to say to man, the λόγος θεους, the fact which cannot be combined with the Greek view of God, namely, that God addresses man in his life here and now.95 In the Gk. λόγος concept one may see an attempt to adjust to life and in some way to master the world in terms of the spirit, which is more than calculable causality. Thus the logos concept of Stoicism is too much controlled by human ratio, which is, of course, rediscovered in nature, world, and God (M. Ant., IV, 4; XII, 26), to offer any parallels to the NT concept, which in the first instance came in the opposite direction from God to man καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμίν (Jn. 1:14). Of course, man has to decide consciously for this λόγος and the life which corresponds to it. But in life κατὰ λόγον (Diog. L., VII, 52 [86]) he does not accept the claim of a will deriving from another world. He comes to himself, to his true being, and attains his → ἐλευθερία,96 by following the most inward law, and consequently God.97 Thus the Gk. λόγλος is revelation only in the sense that one perceives the inner law of the matter, or of self, and orientates oneself thereby.

A further demonstration is to be found in the fact that secular Gk. (e.g., in Stoicism and Neo-platonism) can split up the λόγος into many creative individual or partial logoi in all the phenomena which invest the world with being and reality. To be sure, the λόγος is an expression of harmony.98 It is itself thespiritual bond which holds the world together at its heart (Pos. in PhiloFug., 112: τε γὰρ του̂ ὄντος λόγος δεσμὸς ὢν τω̂ν ἁπάντωνκαὶ συνέχει τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφίγγει κωλύων αὐτὰ διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαρτα̂σθαιἁρμονίαν καὶ ἕνωσιν ἀδιάλυτον ἄλει τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα). But it is not a mediating figure which stands independently between God and the world. Only in so far as the constructive principle is also that which reveals the knowability of things can one speak of the Gk. λόγος having a mediatorial role.

Thirdly, the distinction appears in the fact that the Gk. λόγος in its manifestation is not historically unique. It cannot be dated in time. On the contrary, it is an unbroken working and creating. In the eternal cycle of things (according to the Gk. view of the world) it releases creative and constructive forces, and then takes them back into itself in an eternal process which does not begin with the resolve of a personal God but takes place metaphysically, continually, and eternally in a gradual unfolding of being.

A fourth point is that the Gk. λόγος became, or, in Stoicism and Neo-platonism, is the world. As such it is called a υἱὸς99 του̂ θεου̂, but is no → μονογενής. In the NT, however, the λόγος became this one historically unique man, σάρξ.

From the very first the NT λόγος concept is alien to Gk. thought. But it later became the point of contact between Christian doctrine and Gk. philosophy.100

Kleinknecht

C.     The Word of God in the Old Testament.

1.     The Hebrew Equivalents of the Greek Terms for Word.

The roots אמר and דבר are the main Hebrew equivalents of the Gk. λόγος, also λόγιον, ῥη̂μα, ῥη̂σις. Rarer is מִלָּה, which in Hebrew, where it is not an Aramaic loan word (cf. 2 S. 23:2), is mostly restricted to Job, though it is frequent in the Aram. sections of Daniel. Other Heb. words are inaccurately rendered λόγος and ῥη̂μα (e.g., טַעַם, מִצְוָה, מַשָּׂא, סֵפֶר , פֶּה, פִּתְגָּם, קוֹל , שָׂפָה, שֵׁבֶט , תְּבוּנָה, תּוֹרָה ) and hardly call for consideration in relation to the philology of the word.

Our main concern is with the roots אמר and דבר. Here אֹמֶר, “saying” (Ps. 19:2 f.; 68:11; 77:8; Job 22:28)—perhaps101 the basic form of אֲמָרִים with the relevant suffix constructions—is used only poetically, as is also אִמְרָה. The nouns אֹמֶר and אִמְרָה are found before the exile (Gn. 4:23; Dt. 33:9; Is. 5:24; 28:23; 29:4), but are mostly postexilic. They are usually rendered λόγος (some 20 times), ῥη̂μα (some 29 times), λόγιον, or ῥη̂σις. This poetic meaning is plainly distinguished from the verbal concept אָמַר, “to speak,” “to say,” which is one of the most common words in the language.

The basic classical word for λόγος in history and law, prophecy and poetry, is, however, דָּבָר, “word.” Etymology must start with the noun, not the verb דִּבֶּר, which seems to be denominated from דָּבָר, as shown by the absence of the qal. דִּבָר would appear to be inseparable from דְּבִיר, the “holiest of all,” the “back of the temple.” which gives us the basic sense of “back.” To this corresponds the Arab. dubr “back,” which brings us to the heart of the matter.102 The Arab. ďb̌ra means “to have at one’s back,” the Ethiop. tadabbara “to put on one’s back,” the Aram. d’bar “to be behind” (cf. the German treiben103 and also führen).

In דָּבָר one is thus to seek the “back” or “background” of a matter. Whereas אֹמֶר and אִמְרָה denote a saying or expression in the indefinite sense, דָּבָר is to be regarded as the definite content or meaning of a word in which it has its conceptual background. No thing is דָּבָר in itself, but all things have a דָּבָר, a “background” or “meaning.” It is easy to see that in speech the meaning or concept stands for the thing, so that a thing, as an event, has in its דָּבָר its historical element, and history is thus enclosed in the דְּבָרִים as the background of things.

Analysis of the term דָּבָר shows two main elements which are both of the highest theological significance. We must distinguish between the dianoetic and the dynamic element. Dianoetically, דָּבָר always contains a νου̂ς, a thought. In it is displayed the meaning of a thing, so that דָּבָר always belongs to the field of knowledge. By its דָּבָר a thing is known and becomes subject to thought. To grasp the דָּבָר of a thing is to grasp the thing itself. It becomes clear and transparent; its nature is brought to light. In this connection the word is also distinguished theologically from the spirit, since the OT concept of spirit (רוּחַ) does not originally have this dianoetic element. But along with the dianoetic element is the dynamic, even if this is not always so evident. Every דָּבָר is filled with power which can be manifested in the most diverse energies. This power is felt by the one who receives the word and takes it to himself. But it is present independently of this reception in the objective effects which the word has in history. The two elements, the dianoetic and the dynamic, may be seen most forcefully in the Word of God, and the prophets had a profound grasp of this from both sides, so that in this respect they are the teachers of all theology.

2.     The General Use of דָּבָר as a Rendering of λόγος and ῥη̂μα.

The main Gk. terms for דָּבָר are λόγος and ῥη̂μα.

The LXX uses them as full synonyms, so that we may treat the two together. In the usage of the Pentateuch the proportion between λόγος and ῥη̂μα is 56 to 147, so that ῥη̂μα easily predominates. In Jos., Ju. and Ruth the figures are 26 to 30, almost equal. In the other historical books (S., K., Ch., Ezr.-Neh., Est.) the proportion is 365 to 200, and in the poetical books (Job, Ps., Prv., Qoh., Cant.) 159 to 72, though ῥη̂μα is predominant in Job (50 times as compared with λόγος 19). In the prophets (including Da.) we find λόγος 320 times and ῥη̂μα only 40, so that λόγος occurs eight times more than ῥη̂μα. In the apocr. too Wis., Jdt., Sir., Tob., Bar., 1–4 Macc.), λόγος is much more common (221 times to 40). Except in the Octateuch λόγος is thus the predominant rendering.

It has to be kept in view that in the LXX the meaning of λόγος and ῥη̂μα is much influenced by the basic Heb. דָּבָר. The great significance of λόγος in Stoic philosophy, like that of πνευ̂μα, possibly derives from a Semitic root, since Zeno was certainly a Semite.104 By nature the Gk. word has a mainly dianoetic value; it receives the dynamic element only from the Heb. דָּבָר.

In Gk. attributes like ἀγαθός (ψ 44:1), καλός (Prv. 23:8), ὀρθός (Prv. 16:13), ἄδικος (Prv. 13:5), πονηρός (2 Εσδρ. 23:17; ψ 63:5), σκληρός (Tob. 13:14 א), ψευδής (Jer. 7:4, 8; Ez. 13:8; Sir. 36:19[24]), ἀληθινός (2 Ch. 9:5), σοφός (1 Εσδρ. 3:9) are immediately understandable; and φιλόσοφος (4 Macc. 5:35) and φιλοσοφώτατος (4 Macc. 1:1) are to be explained in terms of Gk., not Heb. But other combinations can be understood only against a Heb. background, e.g., 2 Βας. 19:44: ἐσκληρύνθη λόγος; 24:4: ὑπερίσχυσεν λόγος; ψ 118:74: εἰς τοὺς λόγους σου ἐπήλπισα (cf. v. 81); v. 89: λόγος σου διαμένει; v. 154: διὰ τὸν λόγον σου ζη̂σόν με; ψ 147:4: ἕως τάχους δραμει̂ται λόγος αὐτου̂; Dt. 30:14: ἔστιν σου ἐγγὺς τὸ ῥη̂μα σφόδρα; Jos. 21:45: οὐ διέπεσεν ἀπὸ πάντων τω̂ν ῥημάτων; 2 Βας. 14:20: ἕνεκεν του̂ περιελθει̂ν τὸ πρόσωπον του̂ ῥήματος τούτου; 3 Βας. 13:21, 26: παρεπίκρανας τὸ ῥη̂μα; Tob. 14:4 א: οὐ μὴ διαπέσῃ ῥη̂μα ἐκ τω̂ν λόγων.

Only in the Heb. דָּבָר is the material concept with its energy felt so vitally in the verbal concept that the word appears as a material force which is always present and at work, which runs and has the power to make alive. In connection with ῥη̂μα we might mention here דְּבָרִים == ῥήματα, “history,” as used in 3 Βας. 11:41: ἐν βιβλίῳ ῥημάτων Σαλωμών, or Gn. 15:1; 22:1: μετὰ τὰ ῥήματα ταυ̂τα, etc., whereas the rendering by λόγοι (3 Βας. 14:29 etc.) in such cases is in keeping with the linguistic sense of the Greeks. History is the event established and narrated in the word, so that the thing and its meaning may both be seen, as expressed by the Heb. דְּבָרִים in the plural. From these examples it may be seen that the LXX concept cannot be wholly explained in terms of the Gk. λόγος or ῥη̂μα, but can be fully understood only against the background of the Hebrew דָּבָר.

To the degree that the meaning of a thing is implied in דָּבָר, the whole point is that the word and the thing are co-extensive. Hence the most important attribute of דָּבָר, and of λόγος and ῥη̂μα as translations, is truth.

In keeping is the common reference of the word אֱמֶת (“truth”) to the word. As Yahweh’s words are אֱמֶת (2 S. 7:28), so human words must be (Gn. 42:16, 20: 1 K. 10:6; 17:24; Ps. 45:4; 119:43; 2 Ch. 9:5). If a word is to be valid, the one concerned ratifies it with an Amen (Dt. 27:15 ff. אָמֵן) or Amen, Amen (Nu. 5:22). Similarly, the verb אמן in the ni is used as the sign of attestation of דָּבָר (Gn. 42:20; 3 Βας. 8:26: 1 Ch. 17:23: 2 Ch. 1:9; 6:17) in so far as words are found to be true; and to this there corresponds the fact that one believes a word (Dt. 1:32; 1 K. 10:7; Ps. 106:12, 24; 2 Ch. 9:6). “The sum of the divine word is truth” (Ps. 119:160: רֹאשׁ דְּבָרְךָ אֱמֶת).

In every spoken word there should be a relation of truth between word and thing, and a relation of fidelity between the one who speaks and the one who hears. Hence the word belongs to the moral sphere, in which it must be a witness to something for the two persons concerned.

3.     The דָּבָר of Prophetic Revelation.

a. Revelation in Sign. The history of the theological development of the concept has its roots in prophecy. In what seems to be the oldest Messianic prophecy which we have (2 S. == 2 Βας.] 23:1ff.), where David confesses that he is a prophet (v. 1: נְאֻם דָּוִד), it is said: πνευ̂μα κυρίου ἐλάλησεν ἐν ἐμοί, καὶ λόγος αὐτου̂ (מִלָּתוֹ) ἐπὶ γλώσσης μου. The rare נְאֻם דְּוִד, in contrast to the later נְאֻם יהוה—so that the prophet is the speaker as compared with the later view of Yahweh as the speaker—is very ancient, almost the only other instance being in the Balaam oracles in J (Nu. 24:4, 16, cf. Prv. 30:1). The prophet is seized by God, by His Spirit (רוּחַ) and Word (מִלָּה == λόγος). The power of God finds recognisable expression in the λόγος. The image of the Messianic king, which appears in the λόγος, is evoked by the Spirit. In pneumatic rapture, the prophet receives an ear and eye for this suprasensual picture, and the mystery is thus revealed and imparted.

Equally old is the depiction of the ecstatic Balaam (Nu. 24:4, 16), in whose mouth God sets His Word (Nu. 22:38; 23:5, 16). He speaks as שֹׁמֵעַ אִמְרֵי־אֵל == ἀκούων λόγια θεου̂, as יֹדֵעַ דַּעַת עֶלְיוֹן == ἐπιστάμενος ἐπιστήμην παρὰ Yψίστου (24:16), as one who מַחֲזֵה שַׁדַּי יֶחֱזֶה == ὅρασιν θεου̂ ἰδών in the state of a נֹפֵל וּגְלוּי עֵינַיִם == ἐν ὕπνῳ, ἀποκεκαλυμμένοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτου̂. With opened eye he sees the face of God, with opened ear105 he hears God’s sayings (λόγια). In vision and audition revelation is contained as the knowledge of God (דַּעַת עֶלְיוֹן) which comes forth from God and has God’s plan as its content. Here again one may see the connection between image and word in earliest prophecy. The Messianic picture contains the word of prophecy. Pictorial language is to be translated into words.

The writing prophets of the classical age are also familiar with pictorial revelation which contains the revelation of word. The visions at the call of Isaiah (6) and Ezekiel (1) present images from which the word can be taken.

One might also refer to the visions which God causes Amos to see (7:1ff.; 8:1 f.; 9:1ff.) and with which God’s voice is linked. The image as such already contains a complete revelation. In Ez. the transcendent glory of God is pictorially expressed in the vision at his call (2:1ff.). This finds an echo in the awe of the prophet, which causes him to fall down (2:1ff.). Amos as גְּלוּי עֵינַיִם at once perceives in the five visions the sign of judgment. The sequence of the visions indicates a heightening of the tension from anxiety at approaching judgment to certainty that it is present, so that the last vision depicts utter destruction (9:1ff.). But here a divine word of interpretation is always sought in the picture. In Zechariah we again find instantaneous images whose meaning is at once apparent to the watchful prophet without a word (4:1–6, 10 ff.; 5:1–4, 5ff.). Nevertheless, along with these we also find moving images whose sense cannot be apprehended in a moment but is disclosed only in a temporal process (1:7ff.: 6:1–8), so that even the prophet himself (1:9; 2:4; 4:4; 6:4) needs an interpretative word, let alone his hearers. This is why the angel of interpretation comes to translate the image into a word.

b. Revelation in Sign and Word. In the great writing prophets, however, the significance of the pictorial revelation is much less than that of the verbal revelation. The original voice which they perceive in themselves is no longer revealed as their own voice (2 S. 23:1: נְאֻם דָּוִד) but as the voice of Yahweh (נְּאֻם יְהוָֹה). In the infinitive נאם, the whispering which is not originally to be regarded as articulated speech, the דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה develops constantly increasing clarity and energy.

The interconnection of image and word, in which דָּבָר is the background and meaning of the sign, may again be seen in the puns of, e.g., Amos 8:2, where קַיִץ (“summer fruit”) is linked with קֵץ (“end”), or Jeremiah 1:11 f., where שָׁקֵד (“almond tree”) reminds us of the watchful Yahweh (שֹׁקֵד), so that the sign passes into the sound.

The word does not have to be combined with an image. It can be received as a voice. In the prophets the original sound develops into harmonies and rhythms whose divine sense finds expression in the human word. The word of revelation in saying and sermon may be very short or it may be a most powerful oration.106 In every saying or sermon the original word received from God is the vital nerve so that the finished prophetic address may be described as the Word of God. Reception of God’s Word by the prophets can be called a spiritual process, though the close connection between Word and Spirit which we find in the NT is comparatively rarely seen in the OT.

The Spirit is expressly mentioned, however, in the last words of David (2 S. 23:2) and the oracles of Balaam (Nu. 24:2), and Hosea does not avoid the description אִישׁ הָרוּחַ (9:7). Moreover, that which we call spiritual is implicitly contained in every verbal revelation, though according to OT usage spiritual operations are discerned chiefly in the בָבִיא, the ecstatic, who is not identical with the seer (רֹאֶה, חֹזֶה), and who is distinguished, not so much by the sign and word of revelation, but rather by ecstatic gestures and violent actions.107 It is only as the concept of the seer is gradually merged with that of the ecstatic (cf. 1 S. 9:9) that דָּבָר becomes a mark of the נָבִיא as תּוֹרָה is of the priest (Jer. 18:18).

c. Dissolution of the Sign. In the history of prophecy the דָּבָר increasingly freed itself from the sign and became a pure expression of revelation. The prophet realised that God Himself was addressing him therein. The E formula: Abraham, Abraham (Gn. 22:1 vl.); Jacob, Jacob (46:2); Moses, Moses (Ex. 3:4), suggests the urgency with which the divine voice smites the heart of the hearer and enables him to receive the revelation. The process is very beautifully described in the case of Samuel (1 S. 3:1 ff.). Yahweh reveals Himself (3:21: נִגְלָה יהוה) to him in Shiloh108 by a summons which implies a call, for previously the Word and revelation of Yahweh were not known to him (3:7: טֶרֶם יִגָּלֶה אֵלָיו דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה). He believes that he is hearing the voice of Eli, i.e., a human voice (3:4f.), until Eli sets him on the right track and he declares to God his readiness to hear: דַּבֵּי יְהוָֹה כִּי שֹׁמֵעַ עַבְדֶּךָ (3:9, 10). He then receives the prophecy in clear terms, for Yahweh Himself comes and stands before him (v. 10, cf. Gn. 28:13). This reminds us of the traditional revelation of the דָּבָר to Eliphaz in Job 4:12–16, except that here a figure appeared. Later, it is by the דְּבַר אֱלהִים that Samuel promises Saul the royal dignity (1 S. 9:27), which is thus a divine charisma; and later still he challenges Saul on the performance of the divine word (1 S. 15:13: הָקִים) concerning the Amalekite king, and announces judgment because of Saul’s scorning (v. 23, 26: מָאַסְתָּ אֶת דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה) of the Word of God. The explosive and destructive power of the דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה is here impressively depicted. The דְּבַר־יְהוָֹה which the prophet receives by revelation (1 S. 3:7) embraces both promise and demand. It is despised at the cost of life itself.

From the days of Samuel the דְּבַר־יהוה is the decisive force in the history of Israel. It is given to David through Nathan (2 S. 7:4) and to Elijah (1 K. 17:2, 8). It plays a constructive historical part in